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Evaluating the policy approaches for tackling undeclared work in the 
European Union 
 
Abstract 
When tackling the undeclared economy, an emergent literature has called for the conventional 
rational economic actor approach (which uses deterrents to ensure that the costs of undeclared 
work outweigh the benefits) to be replaced or complemented by a social actor approach which 
focuses upon improving tax morale. Evaluating the validity of doing so using 27,563 
face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 across Europe, multilevel logistic regression 
analysis reveals that both approaches significantly reduce participation in undeclared work. 
When tax morale is high, however, deterrence measures have little impact on reducing the 
probability of participation in undeclared work and it is only when tax morale is low that 
raising the level of deterrents has greater impacts, with increasing the perceived risks of 
detection in such contexts leading to higher reductions in participation in undeclared work than 
increasing the perceived punishments. The paper concludes by calling for more nuanced 
context-bound policy approaches.   
 
Keywords: informal sector; tax morale, institutional theory; tax evasion; European Union 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of different policy approaches that can be used to tackle 
undeclared work. Although there is a growing understanding of the extent and character of 
undeclared work (ILO, 2013; Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams, 2014b), little attention 
has been so far paid to evaluating the various policy approaches available for tackling this 
phenomenon. However, unless effective strategies are developed to tackle monetary 
transactions not declared to the state for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes, not 
only will governments continue to lose considerable public revenue and workers continue to 
face poor quality working conditions, but the unfair competition that legitimate businesses 
face will remain (Andrews et al., 2011). How this sphere can be tackled has thus become a 
matter of growing interest.  
 Conventionally, a rational economic actor approach has been used by governments 
when tackling undeclared work. This views participation in undeclared work as arising when 
the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972), and has resulted in governments seeking to deter participation by increasing 
the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection. However, the recognition in academic 
circles that many citizens voluntarily comply even when the pay-off from undeclared work is 
greater than the expected costs (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008), has resulted 
in calls for DµVRFLDODFWRU¶DSSURDFK. This views participation in undeclared work as arising 
when tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Cummings et al., 2009; 
Torgler, 2007a,b), is low. The consequent argument by academic scholars has been to call for 
an approach that elicits greater voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour by improving tax 
morale (Alm et al., 2012; Alm and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012). Conventionally, these two 
approaches have been seen as mutually exclusive (Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a). Others, 
however, have asserted that they should be used alongside each other (Kirchler et al, 2008). The 
aim of this paper, therefore, is to firstly evaluate the association between participation in 
undeclared work and on the one hand, increasing the risks of detection and level of penalties 
and on the other hand, improving tax morale, and secondly, to evaluate the complex interaction 
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effects between increasing deterrence (i.e., the level of penalties and risks of detection) and tax 
morale (see Alm et al., 2012). This paper advances knowledge, therefore, by evaluating not 
only the effectiveness of the rational actor and social actor approaches in reducing undeclared 
work, but also for the first time the interaction effects. It will reveal that increasing deterrence is 
only effective in reducing the probability of participation in undeclared work when tax morale 
is low, and that in such contexts, increasing the risks of detection is more effective than 
increasing the perceived punishments. 
 To evaluate these policy approaches and their interaction effects, therefore, section 2 
reviews these rational economic actor and social actor approaches along with what is so far 
known about whether they can be combined. Revealing that governments conventionally adopt 
a rational economic actor approach and seldom consider either replacing or combining this 
with a social actor approach, and the lack of evidence on the impacts of these approaches and 
their interaction effects when combined, attention turns to evaluating their impacts and 
interaction effects. To do this, section 3 introduces the data and methodology, namely a 
multilevel logistic regression analysis of 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 in 
the 28 member states of the European Union (EU28). Section 4 then reports the results. Finding 
a significant association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level of 
penalties and risk of detection on the one hand, and participation in undeclared work and the 
level of tax morale on the other, as well as complex interaction effects, section 5 then concludes 
by discussing the need for more nuanced context-bound policy approaches and further research 
on these policy approaches. 
 Before commencing nevertheless, undeclared work must be defined. In this paper, and 
reflecting the consensus in the literature, undeclared work refers to paid work which is legal in 
all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social security or labour law 
purposes (Aliyev, 2015; Boels, 2014; European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2012; Williams, 
2014a,b). If it is not legal in all other respects, it is not part of the undeclared economy. For 
example, if the goods and/or services exchanged are illegal (e.g., illegal drugs), then this is not 
part of the undeclared economy but part of the wider criminal economy.  
 
Reviewing the policy approaches towards undeclared work 
 
Recently, it has been widely recognised that even if the undeclared economy is more prevalent 
in the developing than developed world, it is an extensive and persistent feature in all global 
regions that does not appear to be reducing in size over time (ILO, 2013; Jütting and Laiglesia, 
2009; Schneider and Williams, 2013). Indeed, with some estimates suggesting that 60% of the 
global workforce have their main job in the undeclared economy (Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009), 
tackling undeclared work has become a core issue on the policy agendas of supra-national 
agencies and governments across the globe (European Commission, 2007; ILO, 2014; OECD, 
2014; Williams, 2014a).  
How, therefore, can the undeclared economy be tackled? Reviewing the literature, it 
becomes quickly apparent that there are two distinct approaches grounded in different 
explanations for participation in undeclared work, namely a rational economic actor approach 
that tackles undeclared work by ensuring that payoff from undeclared work is outweighed by 
the costs, and a social actor approach grounded in a view that undeclared work arises when tax 
morale is low. Here, each is considered in turn along with what is so far known about whether 
they are contrasting or complementary approaches. 
 
Rational economic actor approach 
The origins of a rational economic actor approach towards undeclared work lie in the classic 
works of both Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1788) and Cesare Beccaria (Beccaria, 1797). In 
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their classic utilitarian theory of crime, people are rational actors who evaluate the 
opportunities and risks confronting them and disobey the law if the expected penalty and 
probability of being caught is small relative to the benefits of disobeying the law.  
 In the study of crime, this rational actor approach became popularised by Becker (1968) 
during the late 1960s who argued that by increasing the risks of detection and sanctions 
confronting those flouting the law, compliant behaviour would become the rational choice for 
citizens. During the early 1970s, in a seminal paper, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) applied 
%HFNHU¶V UDWLRQDO DFWRU DSSURDFK WR WKH issue of tax non-compliance, viewing the 
non-compliant as rational economic actors who evade tax as long as the pay-off from evasion is 
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished. The goal was therefore to change 
the cost/benefit ratio confronting those engaged or thinking about participating in 
non-compliance and akin to the study of crime, it was argued that this should be achieved by 
increasing the actual and/or perceived penalties and risks of detection. This was subsequently 
widely adopted (e.g., Bernasconi, 1998; Grabiner, 2000; Gramsick and Bursik, 1990; 
Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Job et al., 2007; Lewis, 1982, Milliron and Toy, 1988; Richardson 
and Sawyer, 2001; Sandford, 1999).  
 Until now, however, the evidence that increasing deterrents elicits compliant behaviour 
in the form of reductions in undeclared work is less than conclusive. Some earlier literature 
supportive of this rational actor approach found that increasing the probability of detection 
reduces participation in the undeclared economy, at least for some income groups (Alm et al., 
1992, 1995; Beron et al., 1992; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Dubin et al., 1987; Kinsey and 
Gramsick, 1993; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Slemrod et al., 2001; Varma and Doob, 1998; 
Witte and Woodbury, 1985). Similarly, some also argued that increasing fines reduces the 
undeclared economy (Alm et al., 1995; De Juan et al., 1994; Elffers et al., 1987; Feld and 
Frey, 2002; Friedland, 1982; Friedland et al., 1978; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Schwartz and 
Orleans, 1967; Spicer and Lunstedt, 1976; Varma and Doob, 1998; Webley and Halstead, 
1986; Wenzel, 2004a,b). 
 However, other literature argues that increasing penalties either leads to a growth in 
undeclared work, has no effect, or only a short-term effect (Elffers et al., 1987; Feld and Frey, 
2002; Friedland, 1982; Murphy, 2005; Spicer and Lunstedt, 1976; Varma and Doob, 1998; 
Webley and Halstead, 1986) and that increasing the probability of detection does not result in 
higher levels of compliance (e.g., Dubin et al., 1997; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Elffers et al., 
1987; Shaw et al., 2008; Webley and Halstead, 1986). Some have even claimed that it leads to 
increased non-compliance, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and its 
citizens (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Blumenthal et al., 1998; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; 
Chang and Lai, 2004; Kagan Scholz, 1984; Kirchler et al., 2014; Murphy and Harris, 2007; 
Tyler et al., 2007). Indeed, the most telling rebuttal of the use of deterrents is the suggestion 
that many voluntarily comply even when the level of penalties and risks of detection would 
suggest that they should not if they were truly rational economic actors (Murphy, 2008). To 
evaluate the validity of this rational economic actor approach, therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
   
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the greater the perceived penalties and risk of 
detection, the lower is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work, ceteris paribus. 
H1a: the greater are the perceived penalties, the lower is the likelihood of participation 
in undeclared work, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: the greater are the perceived risks of detection, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work, ceteris paribus. 
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Social actor approach 
In recent years, an alternative way of explaining and tackling undeclared work has become 
more prominent. From this viewpoint, individuals are not always rational economic actors with 
perfect information available to them, but are limited in their ability to compute the costs and 
benefits, often misperceive or do not perceive the true costs of their actions and are influenced 
by their social context (Alm, 2011). Reflected in the fact that many voluntarily comply even 
when the benefit/cost ratio suggests that they should operate on an undeclared basis (Alm et 
al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007) D µVRFLDODFWRU¶PRGHO
has emerged that explains participation in undeclared work to result from low tax morale, by 
which is meant a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler, 2006, 2011; 
Cummings et al., 2009; McKerchar et al, 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
The goal, therefore, is to engender a commitment in citizens to self-regulate by improving 
their tax morale rather than force citizens to comply using threats, harassment and/or bribes 
(Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011).    
 Over a century ago, Georg von Schanz (1890) highlighted the relevance of a tax 
contract between the state and its citizens. Some six decades or so ODWHUWKH*HUPDQµ&RORJQH
VFKRRORI WD[SV\FKRORJ\¶sought to measure tax morale among taxpayers (see Schmölders, 
1952, 1960, 1962; Strümpel, 1969), viewing it as an important and integral attitude that was 
strongly related to tax non-compliance (Schmölders, 1960). Although such research went into 
abeyance with the rise of the rational economic actor model from the 1970s, since the turn of 
the millennium, it has begun to resurface (see for example, Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2007; Torgler, 2003, 2005a,b, 2006a,b, 2007, 2011). The goal is to raise tax 
morale so as to elicit greater voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour (Alm and Torgler, 
2011; Torgler, 2012). Rather than governments pursue compliance through close supervision 
and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed procedures and centralised structures within the 
context of a low commitment, low trust and adversarial culture, a high trust, high 
commitment culture is thus pursued to align the values of citizens with the formal rules so as 
to generate internal control (Williams, 2014a).  
 Viewing this tax morale approach through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and 
Blinder, 2008; North, 1990), which views all societies as having both formal institutions, 
which are codified laws and regulations that define the legal rules of the game, as well as 
informal institutions, which are WKHµVRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\XQZULWWHQWKDWDUHFUHDWHG
communicated and HQIRUFHGRXWVLGHRIRIILFLDOO\VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV¶+HOPNHDQG/HYLWVN\
2004: 727), it can be seen that tax morale measures the gap between the formal institutions 
ZKLFKZHKHUH WHUPµVWDWHPRUDOH¶DQG LQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV KHUH WHUPHG µFLYLFPRUDOH¶). 
When this gap is large, tax morale will be low and participation in undeclared work more 
prevalent. To evaluate the validity of adopting this policy approach towards undeclared work, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): the greater the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work, ceteris paribus. 
  
Contrasting or complementary policy approaches  
At present when tackling undeclared work, most governments in both the developed world and 
beyond pursue a rational economic actor approach that seeks to increase the penalties and 
probability of detection so as to deter participation. Indeed, examining the opinions of senior 
government officials across the EU28 on what is the most important approach in their 
countries, as well as what is the most effective approach, Williams et al. (2013) reveal that just 
10% assert view reducing tax morale as the most important approach when tackling undeclared 
work in their country (most of whom are in Nordic nations). The majority (57%) view the most 
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important approach as increasing the costs of undeclared work (i.e., increasing the level of 
punishments and risks of detection) with the remainder (33%) stating that the focus is upon 
increasing the benefits of compliant behaviour. Similarly, 55% view increasing the costs of 
undeclared work as also the most effective approach with just 10% again viewing the tax 
morale approach as the most effective.   
 Given this current dominance of the rational economic actor approach, a recent 
emergent discussion in the scholarly literature has been whether the social actor approach 
should be adopted as either an alternative or complement to the rational actor approach. 
Although some have viewed this social actor approach as an alternative to the rational 
economic actor approach (Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a; Williams and Renooy, 2013), 
the vast majority of the emergent literature has viewed them as complementary rather than 
competing approaches. In what has become known as the µVOLSSHU\ VORSH¶ DSSURDFK WKH
argument is that governments can pursue QRWRQO\ µHQIRUFHG¶FRPSOLDQFHE\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH
penalties and risks of detection and therefore the power of authorities, but also µYROXQWDU\¶
compliance by improving tax morale and therefore trust in authorities (Kirchler et al., 2008; 
Kogler et al., 2015; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014; Muehlbacher et al., 
2011; Prinz et al., 2013; Wahl et al., 2010). The assertion has been that when there is neither 
trust in authorities and authorities have no power, then undeclared work will be more prevalent. 
When trust in, and/or the power of, authorities increases however, then undeclared work 
reduces.  
 Wahl et al. (2010) randomly present participants in a laboratory experiment with one of 
four different descriptions of a fictitious country, in which the authorities were depicted on the 
one hand, as either trustworthy or untrustworthy and on the other hand, as either powerful or 
powerless. Their results reveal that participants paid significantly more taxes when both power 
and trust were high. They additionally reveal that voluntary compliance was highest when the 
authorities were both trustful and powerful, while enforced compliance was highest when 
authorities were portrayed as powerful, but not trustworthy. This is further reinforced by two 
additional surveys of real-world taxpayers (Muehlbacher et al., 2011a,b). The outcome is that a 
combination of greater trust in authorities and the greater power of authorities is seen as a 
potent combination. Grounded in this finding, the argument has been that pursuing both is the 
most effective means of tackling undeclared work (Kogler et al., 2015).   
There is an emergent recognition however, that increasing the power of authorities and 
trust of authorities may have complex interaction effects. Applying higher penalties and risks 
of detection might not always lead to the same outcome. In situations where there is already 
high tax morale, for example, it has been purported that increasing the penalties and risks of 
detection might lead to greater non-compliance, not least due to a breakdown of trust between 
the state and its citizens (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Blumenthal et al., 1998; Brehm and 
Brehm, 1981; Chang and Lai, 2004; Kagan Scholz, 1984; Kirchler et al., 2014; Murphy and 
Harris, 2007; Tyler et al., 2007). The intimation, therefore, is that increasing the perceived 
penalties and risks of detection may well have varying effects on participation in undeclared 
work depending on the level of tax morale in existence. Until now, however, little if no 
research has been conducted on their complex interactions and dynamics so as to move towards 
a variegated understanding of the interactions between deterrents and tax morale. To begin to 
do so and to evaluate whether there is a need for a more nuanced context-bound understanding 
of the relationship between deterrents, tax morale and participation in undeclared work, the 
following hypothesis can be tested:  
 
Interaction effects hypothesis (H3): the effect of perceived penalties and risk of detection 
on the likelihood of participation in undeclared work is different at varying levels of tax 
morale, ceteris paribus. 
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H3a: the effect of perceived penalties on the likelihood of participation in undeclared 
work is different at varying levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus. 
H3b: the effect of perceived risk of detection on the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work is different at varying levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus. 
 
Methodology 
 
Data 
To analyse these hypotheses, data is reported from special Eurobarometer survey no. 402 
conducted in 2013, which involved 27,563 face-to-face interviews across the EU-28. These 
interviews were undertaken in the national language with adults aged 15 years and older. In 
each country, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was employed, with 
interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 1,500 in larger nations, to ensure that on 
the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as each level of sample 
was representative in proportion to its population size. For the univariate analysis, a sample 
weighting scheme was used to obtain meaningful descriptive results, as recommended in the 
wider literature (Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) and the 
Eurobarometer methodology. For the multivariate analysis however, debate exists over 
whether to use a weighting scheme (Pfefferman, 1993; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 
2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reflecting the majoritarian view, the decision has been 
taken here not to do so.  
Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the interview schedule adopted a gradual 
approach towards the more sensitive questions. Firstly, participants were asked attitudinal 
questions regarding the acceptability of various forms of undeclared work and their 
perceptions of the penalties and risks of detection. This was then followed by questions on 
whether they had purchased undeclared goods and services and finally, whether they had 
participated in undeclared work themselves.  
 
Variables 
To evaluate whether increasing the penalties and risks of detection, and higher tax morale, 
reduces the likelihood of participation in undeclared work in the EU28, the dependent variable 
used is D GXPP\ YDULDEOH ZLWK UHFRUGHG YDOXH  IRU SHUVRQV ZKR DQVZHUHG µ\HV¶ WR WKH
question µApart from a regular employment, have you yourself carried out any undeclared 
paid activities in the last 12 months?¶ 
To evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work and the policy 
approaches, three explanatory variables are used. Firstly, to evaluate whether the perceived risk 
of detection influences participation, a dummy variable (risk) was used describing the 
perceived risk of being detected when engaging in undeclared work, with value 0 for a very 
small or fairly small risk and value 1 for a fairly high or very high risk. Secondly, to evaluate 
how penalties are associated with participation, a dummy variable (sanctions) was used, 
describing the expected sanctions if caught doing undeclared work, with value 0 for those 
asserting that the normal tax or social security contributions would be due and value 1 for those 
stating that the normal tax or social security contributions due, plus there would be a fine or 
imprisonment.  
Third and finally, to evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work 
and tax morale, a continuous variable (tax morale) was used by constructing an index of 
self-reported attitudes towards the acceptability of undeclared work based on a 10-point Likert 
scale. Rather than use a single question to assess tax morale, this survey thus uses a range of 
questions by asking the following:  
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Now I would like to know how you would rate various actions or behaviours. For each of 
them, please tell me to what extent you find it acceptable or not. Please use the following 
VFDOH³´PHDQVWKDW\RXILQGLWDEVROXWHO\XQDFFHSWDEOHDQG³´PHDQVWKDW\RXILQGLW
absolutely acceptable: (1) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; (2) 
an individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment 
received to the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared; (3) A 
firm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the 
tax or social security authorities; (4) a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does 
not declare its activities to the tax or social security authorities; (5) a firm hires an 
individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him\her are not officially declared and (6) 
someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income. 
 
&ROODWLQJUHVSRQVHVWRWKHVHVL[TXHVWLRQVDQDJJUHJDWHµWD[PRUDOHLQGH[¶LVFRQVWUXFWHGIRU
HDFKLQGLYLGXDO7KH&URQEDFK¶V$OSKDFRHIILFLHQWRIWKHVFDOH is 0.863 which shows a good 
internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000). The index is represented here in the 10-point 
Likert scale original format. The lower the index value, the higher is the tax morale. 
Drawing upon previous studies evaluating participation in undeclared work in terms of 
the important socio-demographic and socio-economic variables determining engagement 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,b; Williams and Padmore, 2013a,b), the control variables 
selected are:  
 Gender (men): a dummy variable with value 0 for women and 1 for men. 
 Age (age): a continuous variable indicating the exact age of the respondent. 
 Occupation (occup): a categorical variable grouping respondents by their occupation 
with value 1 for unemployed, value 2 for self-employed, value 3 for managers, value 4 
for other white collars, value 5 for manual workers, value 6 for house persons, value 7 
for retired individuals, and value 8 for students. 
 Difficulties paying bills (bills): a categorical variable for the respondent difficulties in 
paying bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for 
occasionally, and value 3 for almost never/never. 
 People 15+ years in own household (household): a categorical variable for people 15+ 
years in respondent¶s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, 
value 2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons, and value 4 for 4 persons or more. 
 Children (children): a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in 
the household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children. 
 Area (area): a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 
for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for large 
town. 
 Region (region): a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with 
value 1 for East-Central Europe, value 2 for Western Europe, value 3 for Southern 
Europe, and value 4 for Nordic Nations. 
In the following analysis, only those respondents were kept for which data on each and every 
control variable was available, which totalled 20,131 of the 27,563 respondents. 
Before analysing the results nevertheless, the reliability of the data collected needs to 
be briefly discussed, especially given the sensitive topic involved. The finding is that in 93% of 
the interviews, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant, 
and average cooperation in 6% of cases. Cooperation was asserted to be poor in only 1% of 
cases. Nonetheless, the level of excellent and good cooperation was found to be higher in 
Nordic nations (98% of cases) and lowest in Southern Europe (88% of cases), which intimates 
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that the sincerity of respondents when answering the questions might have been lower in 
Southern Europe. Given this caveat, attention turns to an analysis of the results.  
 
Analytical methods  
To evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived 
penalties and risk of detection, and the level of tax morale, a multi-level logistic regression 
analysis is conducted. The analysis was undertaken in two stages. The first stage was to 
estimate a baseline random intercept model with no explanatory variables, in order to identify 
whether a multi-level approach was appropriate. The second stage involved constructing a 
model with first-level (i.e. individual-level) variables in an attempt to understand their effect 
and thus to test the three hypotheses.  
Thus, our final logit random intercept model specification including both, individual 
level explanatory variables and their interactions, and country level explanatory variables, is 
the following (Steele, 2009): ሺ ߨ௜௝ ? െ ߨ௜௝ሻ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௝ ൅ ߚଶ ௝ܺ ൅ ݑ௝ 
where, ߚ଴ is the overall intercept, ߚଵ is the cluster specific effect, ߚଶ is the contextual effect, ܺ௜௝ is the vector containing individual level explanatory variables and their interactions, ௝ܺ is 
the vector containing country level explanatory variables and ݑ௝  is the group (random) effect. 
  According to the hypotheses and the control variables listed above, we expect that the 
full test equation will have the below derivation of the signs. The expected direction of the 
signs for the control variable was extracted from previous studies on the socio-demographic, 
socio-economic and spatial characteristics of undeclared work in the European Union (see 
Williams and Franic, 2015; Williams and Horodnic, 2015b).   
 ሺ గ೔ೕଵିగ೔ೕሻ ൌߚ଴ െ ߚଵݏܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௝ െ ߚଶݎ݅ݏ݇௜௝ ൅ ߚଷݐܽݔ௜௝ ൅ ߚସ݉݁݊௜௝ െ  ߚହܽ݃݁௜௝ െ ߚ଺݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚ଻݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െߚ଼݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚଽ݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵ଴݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵଵ݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵଶ݋ܿܿݑ݌ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵଷܾ݈݈݅ݏ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵସܾ݈݈݅ݏ ?௜௝ െߚଵହ݄݋ݑݏ݄݁݋݈݀ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵ଺݄݋ݑݏ݄݁݋݈݀ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵ଻݄݋ݑݏ݄݁݋݈݀ ?௜௝ െ ߚଵ଼݄݈ܿ݅݀ݎ݁݊௜௝ െ ߚଵଽܽݎ݁ܽ ?௜௝ െ ߚଶ଴ܽݎ݁ܽ ?௜௝ ൅ߚଶଵݏܽ݊ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏܺݐܽݔ௜௝ ൅ ߚଶଶݎ݅ݏ݇ܺݐܽݔ௜௝ െ ߚଶଷݎ݁݃݅݋݊ ?௝ െ ߚଶସݎ݁݃݅݋݊ ?௝ ൅  ߚଶହݎ݁݃݅݋݊ ?௝ ൅ ݑ௝  
Below, we report the results. 
 
Findings 
 
Examining the descriptive findings, Table 1 displays that 4 per cent of participants reported 
engaging in undeclared work during the past 12 months. Even if participation in undeclared 
work is a sensitive issue, resulting in this being a lower-bound estimate of the level of 
participation, 1 in 26 citizens of EU-28 reported engaging in undeclared work in the past year. 
The level of participation, moreover, varies across EU regions. Nordic nations have the highest 
participation rates (6 per cent) whilst in East-Central Europe it is 4 per cent, 4 per cent in 
Western Europe and 3 per cent in Southern Europe. This should be cautiously interpreted given 
the above discussed variations in the level of cooperation of respondents in Southern Europe 
compared with Nordic nations. As previous studies reveal however, just because participation 
rates are higher in Nordic nations does not mean that they have larger undeclared economies. 
Much of this participation in undeclared work in Nordic nations is composed of one-off and 
small-scale paid favours for close social relations such as kin, friends and acquaintances, as is 
also the case in Western Europe, whereas in East-Central Europe and Southern Europe, 
participation in undeclared work is more often composed of waged employment and/or 
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undeclared self-employment conducted on a more continuous basis (Eurofound, 2013; 
Williams and Horodnic, 2015c).  
 Turning to the relationship between participation in undeclared work and the various 
policy approaches, Table 1 reveals the differences between those engaged and not engaged in 
undeclared work regarding their perceptions of the risks of detection, the expected sanctions if 
caught and their tax morale. Those engaged in undeclared work perceive the expected 
sanctions and risk of detection as lower than those not doing undeclared work; 32 per cent of 
those doing undeclared work consider that only the normal tax or social security contributions 
will be due if caught compared with just 24 per cent of those not engaged in undeclared work. 
Similarly, 72 per cent of those doing undeclared work perceive the risk of being detected as 
very small or fairly small, compared with 59 per cent of those not engaged in undeclared work. 
Those engaging in undeclared work, moreover, have a lower level of tax morale (3.5) 
compared with those not engaging in undeclared activities (2.2). These trends are the same 
across all EU regions. As such, participants in undeclared work across all EU regions view the 
severity of the punishment as lower, a smaller risk of detection and have a lower level of tax 
morale than those not engaging in undeclared work. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
To determine whether these relationships are significant when other control variables are taken 
into account and held constant, as well as the interaction effects, the first stage was to estimate 
a baseline random intercept model with no explanatory variables to identify whether a 
multi-level approach was appropriate. This analysis indicated that over 12 per cent of the 
variance in supplying undeclared work was accounted for at the country level (Wald = 9.91, 
df=1, p<0.005), indicating significant variation between countries in the prevalence of 
supplying undeclared work. Having determined that the multilevel mixed-effects logistic 
regressions should be used, the second stage involved constructing a model including both, 
individual level explanatory variables and their interactions, and country level explanatory 
variables, to test the three hypotheses.  
Table 2 reports the results of a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression analysis of 
engagement in undeclared work. Before examining the findings regarding the policy 
approaches, it is important to highlight the groups most likely to participate in undeclared work 
and thus that need to be targeted. This reveals that men are significantly more likely to 
participate in undeclared work than women and so too are younger people, those living in 
smaller households, without children and facing difficulties in paying the household bills. 
Compared with unemployed people, moreover, only the self-employed and house persons are 
more likely to engage in undeclared work. This, therefore, provides a clear indication of who 
needs to be targeted across the EU28 as a whole in terms of the population groups currently 
most likely to participate in undeclared work.  
Turning to the policy approaches and starting with whether participation in undeclared 
work is associated with the perceived level of penalties when other variables are introduced 
and held constant, a statistically significant association is identified. Those viewing the 
expected sanctions to be higher (i.e. tax or social security contributions plus a fine or prison) 
are less likely to engage in undeclared work (confirming H1a). It is similarly the case that a 
significant association exists between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level 
of risk of being detected. Those considering the risk of being caught as fairly high or very high 
are less likely to engage in undeclared work compared with those who consider the risk of 
being caught as fairly small and very small (confirming H1b). These results, therefore, validate 
the rational economic actor approach adopted by many governments; increasing the actual or 
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perceived penalties and risks of detection appears to reduce the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Turning to the social actor approach, the finding again is that participation in undeclared work 
is significantly associated with the level of tax morale. The direction of the association is that 
the higher the tax morality, the lower is the propensity to participate in undeclared work 
(confirming H2). This multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression analysis therefore displays a 
strong association between the likelihood of participating in undeclared work and not only the 
level of punishments and risk of detection but also the level of tax morale.   
Is it the case therefore, that decreases in the level of participation in undeclared work 
would be greater if a government combines the conventional rational economic actor approach 
of increasing the level of punishments and/or risk of detection, with the social actor approach 
of seeking to improve the level of tax morale? Model 2 in Table 3 introduces the interaction 
terms between tax morale and the level of punishment and risk of detection respectively, in 
order to investigate if the effects of these two deterrence measures have a different impact on 
engaging in undeclared work for different levels of tax morale. This reveals that the effect of 
the perceived penalties on the likelihood of participation in undeclared work is different at 
different levels of tax morale (confirming H3a). However, the interaction term between the risk 
of detection and tax morale is not significant overall (refuting the H3b). Table 3 provides a 
summary of which hypotheses have been confirmed and which not.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
  
To analyse these interactions between the perceived level of punishment, the perceived risk of 
being detected and tax morality, Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities of a 
µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶(XURSHDQFLWL]HQHQJDJing in undeclared work by their level of tax morale and 
what they perceive as the likely penalties and risk of detection. Here, the µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶
European citizen is derived by taking the mean and modal values of the other independent 
variables. As such, the representative citizen is a 47 year-old retired woman, living in a two 
person household, located in a small or middle sized town in Western Europe, with no children, 
who never or almost never has financial difficulties in paying the household bills. As 
graphically displayed in Figure 1, as trust in authorities (i.e., tax morale) worsens, the predicted 
odds of this representative citizen engaging in undeclared work is smaller when the power of 
authorities is strongest (i.e., the risk of being detected is fairly high or very high and s/he 
expects that the punishment for such a behaviour will be to pay the tax or social contribution 
due plus they will receive a fine or imprisonment). This reveals the importance of increasing 
the level of deterrence to prevent participation in undeclared work in contexts where tax morale 
is low. 
 However, when there is trust in authorities with tax morale relatively high (i.e., below a 
score of 5), increasing the power of authorities has only a minor impact on the probability of 
participating in undeclared work. Indeed, the predicted probability of engaging in undeclared 
work only reduces when the perceived risk of detection increases, but the perceived level of 
punishment has no influence on the likelihood of participation. As trust in authorities worsens 
(i.e., tax morale decreases) however, the power of authorities (i.e., the perceived level of 
punishment and risk of detection) plays an ever greater role in determining the level of 
participation in undeclared work. Indeed, it is only when tax morale decreases below a score of 
5 that the power of authorities (i.e., the perceived level of punishment and risk of detection) 
plays a more significant role in reducing the predicted odds of the representative citizen 
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engaging in undeclared work. In such low trust environments, the greater the power of 
authorities, the lower is the probability of participation in undeclared work, with higher risks of 
detection having a greater impact on reducing participation in undeclared work than higher 
perceived punishments. 
 Consequently, when there is high tax morale, the power of authorities has little overall 
impact on the probability of participation in undeclared work and only increasing the perceived 
risk of detection that has any positive impact on reducing participation. When tax morale is low 
(i.e., above 5) however, increasing the power of authorities has a greater impact on reducing 
participation, with increasing the perceived risks of detection having a greater impact on 
reducing participation in undeclared work than increasing the perceived punishments.     
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In recent years, a debate has emerged about how undeclared work should be tackled. Until 
now, however, there has been little evaluation of the effectiveness of the various policy 
approaches. In this paper, we have started to evaluate not only the validity of pursuing the 
conventional rational economic actor approach which seeks to increase the penalties and risks 
of detection, but also the social actor approach, and the interaction effects of combining these 
two approaches. 
 Examining whether increasing the penalties and risks of detection, as well as tax 
morale, is associated with participation in undeclared work, the finding is that engagement in 
undeclared work decreases as the perceived level of penalties and risks of detection increase, as 
well as when tax morale improves. This suggests that both the conventional rational economic 
actor as well as the social actor approach seem likely to be effective in reducing participation in 
undeclared work. The intimation, therefore, is that these are not alternative competing 
approaches but can be combined when tackling participation in undeclared work, as the 
µVOLSSHU\ VORSH¶ DSSURDFK KDV DUJXHG (Kirchler et al, 2008). However, and importantly for 
public authorities, when examining the interaction effects, the finding is that the impact of 
increasing the power of authorities may vary at different levels of tax morale. Examining this 
for the probability of the µUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶(8FLWL]HQHQJDJLQJLQXndeclared work, the finding 
is that when trust in authorities and therefore tax morale is relatively high (i.e., below a score of 
5), increasing the power of authorities has only a minor impact on the probability of 
participating in undeclared work, and only in relation to changes in the perceived risk of 
detection. It is only when trust in authorities worsens and tax morale decreases below a score of 
5 that the power of authorities (i.e., the perceived level of punishment and risk of detection) 
plays a more significant role in reducing the predicted odds of the representative citizen 
engaging in undeclared work. In such low trust environments, the greater the power of 
authorities, the lower is the probability of participation in undeclared work, with higher risks of 
detection reducing the predicted odds of participation in undeclared work to a greater extent 
than higher perceived punishments.  
  Overall, in consequence, it appears that if participation in undeclared work is to be 
reduced, there should be greater focus upon improving tax morale. The conventional rational 
economic actor approach focused on deterrents is not everywhere and always necessary. This 
is particularly the case in populations where there is trust in authorities. Indeed, in such 
populations, increasing the perceived level of penalties and risk of detection has no impact on 
the probability of participation in undeclared work. The use of deterrents is only influential 
when tax morale is low. The currently widely used rational actor approach therefore needs to 
be at a very minimum complemented by a social actor approach which focuses upon improving 
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tax morale. What policy measures, therefore, can be used to achieve this? Viewing low tax 
morale through the lens of institutional theory as a measure of the lack of alignment of the laws, 
codes and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of informal 
institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990; Webb et al., 2009), two sets of policy 
initiatives can be seen as necessary to reduce the gap EHWZHHQ WKH IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV µVWDWH
PRUDOH¶DQGLQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVµFLYLFPRUDOH¶, and consequently induce improvements in 
tax morale and reduce participation in undeclared work.  
 On the one hand, policy initiatives are required to alter the norms, values and beliefs 
regarding the acceptability of undeclared work. These might be firstly, campaigns to raise 
awareness about the benefits of declared work and costs of undeclared work, and secondly, tax 
education initiatives to educate citizens about the benefits of taxation in terms of the public 
goods and services received for the taxes they pay. Policy initiatives that could be pursued 
range from introducing education about taxes into civic education in schools, through letters to 
taxpayers about how their taxes are being VSHQWWRVLJQVVWDWLQJµ\RXUWD[HVSDLGIRUWKLV¶LQ
hospitals, doctors surgeries, roads and schools.  
 On the other hand, however, policy initiatives to reform the products and processes of 
formal institutions are also required, particularly in nations in which there are formal 
institutional deficiencies which lead to a lack of trust in government. Firstly, this requires 
policy initiatives to change the country-level conditions that lead to lower tax morale, such as 
by increasing the level of expenditure on active labour market policies to support vulnerable 
groups and the level of expenditure on social protection (Autio and Fu, 2015; Dau and 
Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Klapper et al., 2007; Thai and Turkina, 2014). Secondly, it involves 
changing how formal institutions operate. As previous studies on public institutions reveal, 
trust in government and voluntary compliance improves when citizens believe that their 
interactions with public authorities will be based on: procedural justice, which refers to 
citizens believing that the government treats them in a respectful, impartial and responsible 
manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000, Gangl et al., 2013; Murphy, 2005; Taylor, 2005; 
Tyler, 1997, Wenzel, 2002); distributive fairness, which refers to citizens believing that they 
pay their fair share compared with others (Kirchgässner, 2010, 2011; McGee, 2005, 2008; 
McGee, Alver and Alver, 2008; Molero and Pujol, 2012), and distributive justice, which refers 
to citizens believing that they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes that 
they pay (Kirchgässner, 2010, McGee, 2005).  
 Tackling undeclared work, therefore, not only requires public authorities to pay 
attention to deterrents such as increasing the perceived penalties and risks of detection (e.g., 
by increasing workplace inspections), albeit only in low trust environments. It also requires 
public authorities to also pursue broader initiatives to increase voluntary compliance. This 
includes not only pursuing macro-level economic and social policy measures (e.g., increasing 
intervention in the labour market to help vulnerable groups and increasing expenditure on 
social protection), but also improving the quality of government by focusing upon enhancing 
procedural and distributive justice and fairness. Indeed, unless such wider initiatives are 
pursued, DV\PPHWU\ ZLOO SHUVLVW EHWZHHQ IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV µVWDWH PRUDOH¶ DQG LQIRUPDO
LQVWLWXWLRQVµFLYLFPRUDOH¶, and trust in government and voluntary compliance will remain 
low, resulting in relatively higher participation in undeclared work. These findings, 
nevertheless, are based on just one dataset and are thus tentative. 
 In sum, if this paper stimulates further data collection and evaluations of the different 
policy approaches used to tackle undeclared work, as well as the interaction effects of 
combining them, both in individual countries and other global regions, then this paper will 
have fulfilled one of its intentions. If this then results in governments widening the range of 
policy approaches and measures used to tackle undeclared work beyond the currently 
dominant approach of increasing the penalties and risks of detection, then it will have 
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fulfilled its wider objective. What is certain, however, is that it cannot continue to be assumed 
that the conventional deterrence approach is the most effective approach, especially in 
contexts where tax morale is not low.   
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Table 1. Supply of undeclared work: expected sanctions, detection risk, and tax morale by EU 
region (N = 20,131) 
 
  
 EU 
28 
Western 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
East-Central 
Europe 
Nordic 
nations 
Engaged in undeclared work (%) 4 4 3 4 6 
Expected sanctions (%)      
Tax or social security contributions due 32 26 40 46 22 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison 68 74 60 54 78 
Detection risk (%)      
Very small/ Fairly small    72 70 70 75 83 
Fairly high/ Very high 28 30 30 25 17 
Tax morale (mean) 3.5 3.7 2.6 4.1 2.7 
Not engaged in undeclared work (%) 96 96 97 96 94 
Expected sanctions (%)      
Tax or social security contributions due 24 19 25 41 18 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison 76 81 75 59 82 
Detection risk (%)      
Very small/ Fairly small    59 59 57 58 71 
Fairly high/ Very high 41 41 43 42 29 
Tax morale (mean) 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.6 1.8 
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Table 2. Multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression of propensity to participate in undeclared 
work  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Fixed part E  se(E) Exp(E) E  se(E) Exp(E) 
Constant -1.465 *** 0.281 0.231 -1.195 *** 0.299 0.303 
Expected sanctions (CG: Tax or social security contributions due)      
Tax or social security contributions + fine or 
prison 
-0.204 ** 0.079 0.816 -0.645 *** 0.157 0.525 
Detection risk (CG: Very small/ Fairly small)        
Fairly high/ Very high -0.621 *** 0.083 0.538 -0.548 *** 0.164 0.578 
Tax morality 0.388 *** 0.020 1.474 0.319 *** 0.034 1.375 
Gender (CG: Women)         
Men 0.691 *** 0.078 1.995 0.689 *** 0.078 1.992 
Age (exact age) -0.030 *** 0.003 0.971 -0.030 *** 0.003 0.971 
Occupation (CG: Unemployed)         
Self-employed 0.100  0.149 1.105 0.094  0.149 1.098 
Managers -0.824 *** 0.160 0.439 -0.828 *** 0.160 0.437 
Other white collars -0.657 *** 0.150 0.519 -0.657 *** 0.150 0.518 
Manual workers -0.506 *** 0.121 0.603 -0.503 *** 0.121 0.605 
House persons -0.266  0.193 0.766 -0.271  0.192 0.763 
Retired -0.880 *** 0.173 0.415 -0.885 *** 0.173 0.413 
Students -0.564 *** 0.153 0.569 -0.575 *** 0.153 0.563 
Difficulties paying bills (CG: Most of the time)          
From time to time -0.550 *** 0.107 0.577 -0.545 *** 0.106 0.580 
Almost never/ never -0.958 *** 0.109 0.384 -0.952 *** 0.109 0.386 
People 15+ years in own household (CG: One)          
Two -0.332 *** 0.095 0.718 -0.338 *** 0.095 0.713 
Three -0.255 ** 0.117 0.775 -0.263 ** 0.117 0.769 
Four and more -0.370 *** 0.131 0.691 -0.375 *** 0.131 0.687 
Children (CG: No children)           
Having children -0.149 * 0.086 0.862 -0.146 * 0.086 0.864 
Area (CG: Rural area or village)         
Small or middle sized town -0.094  0.087 0.910 -0.088  0.087 0.915 
Large town -0.110  0.095 0.896 -0.109  0.095 0.897 
Region (CG: East-Central Europe)         
Western Europe -0.003  0.268 0.997 -0.004  0.269 0.996 
Southern Europe -1.166 *** 0.321 0.312 -1.163 *** 0.322 0.313 
Nordic Nations 0.714 * 0.377 2.042 0.726 * 0.378 2.066 
Interaction terms         
Expected sanctions: Tax or social security contributions + fine or 
prison x Tax morality 
 0.123 *** 0.038 1.131 
Detection risk: Fairly high/ Very high x Tax morality  -0.020  0.040 0.979 
N 20,131 20,131 
Random part         
Country-level variance 0.2933*** 0.2950*** 
(Standard error) 0.0947 0.0954 
Countries 28 28 
Variance at country level (%) 8.19 8.23 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets.  
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Table 3. Evaluation of the hypotheses 
Hypothesis Result (p<0.01)  
H1: The greater the perceived penalties and risk of detection, the lower 
is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
H1a: The greater are the perceived penalties, the lower is the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work, ceteris 
paribus. 
Confirmed 
H1b: The greater are the perceived risks of detection, the lower is 
the likelihood of participation in undeclared work, ceteris 
paribus. 
Confirmed 
H2: The greater the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed 
H3: The effect of perceived penalties and risk of detection on the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work is different at 
varying levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3a: The effect of perceived penalties on the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work is different at varying 
levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus. 
Confirmed 
H3b: The effect of perceived risk of detection on the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work is different at varying 
levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus. 
Not confirmed 
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Tax morality 
Tax or social security contributions due, Detection risk: Very small/ Fairly small 
Tax or social security contributions due, Detection risk: Fairly high/ Very high 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison, Detection risk: Very small/ Fairly small 
Tax or social security contributions + fine or prison, Detection risk: Fairly high/ Very high 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Variables used in the analysis: definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition 
Undeclared work ± labour 
supply side  
(N = 20,131) 
Mode or mean Min / Max 
Supply of undeclared 
work (dependent 
variable) 
Dummy variable of undeclared paid activities 
carry out in the last 12 months, apart from a 
regular employment 
Not engaged in 
undeclared work (96%) 
0 / 1 
Expected sanctions Dummy for the penalties associated with 
participation in undeclared activities 
Tax or social security 
contributions + fine or 
prison (75%) 
0 / 1 
Detection risk Dummy for the perceived risk of detection Very small/ Fairly small 
(59%) 
0 / 1 
Tax morality Constructed index of self-reported tolerance 
towards tax non-compliance 
2.2 1 / 10 
Gender Dummy for the gender of the respondent Female (51%) 0 / 1 
Age  Respondent exact age 47 years 15 / 96 
Occupation Respondent occupation in categories Retired (25%) 1 / 8 
Difficulties paying bills Respondent difficulties in paying bills in 
categories 
Almost never/ never 
(61%) 
1 / 3 
People 15+ years in own 
household 
People 15+ years in respondent`s household 
(including the respondent) in categories 
Two (48%) 1 / 4 
Children Dummy for the presence of children (up to 14 
years old) in the household 
No children (71%) 0 / 1 
Area Size of the area where the respondent lives in 
categories 
Small or middle sized 
town (41%) 
1 / 3 
Region Region where the respondent lives in categories Western Europe (52%) 1 / 4 
 
 
